In this work, we propose a cryptanalysis of the nonlinear sequence generator called the shrinking generator. The output sequence of this cryptographic generator, the shrunken sequence, can be modelled as one of the output sequences of linear cellular automata (CA). The shrunken sequence and the other sequences generated by the CA can be reduced to a combination of PNsequences generated by the same characteristic polynomial. Therefore, all these PN-sequences are the same but shifted. We propose an efficient cryptanalysis that takes advantage of the linearity of these PN-sequences and the CA.
Introduction
The PN-sequences generated by maximum-length linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) [5] have applications in several areas. However, for their use in cryptography, such sequences are combined by means of nonlinear functions to destroy their linearity. These structures generate sequences with high linear complexity, long period and good statistical properties [4] .
In [1] , it was proven that one-dimensional linear CA generate exactly the same PN sequences as those generated by maximum-length LFSRs. In [4] , the authors proved that linear 90/150 CA generate exactly the same sequences as those of certain nonlinear generators based on LFSRs. In this work, we show that a well-known class of LFSR-based nonlinear generators, the sequence generators based on decimation, can be modelled in terms of linear 102 CA. The linearity of the CA can be advantageously used to propose a cryptanalysis against the shrinking generator and recover the output sequence.
Basic concepts
The shrinking generator is composed of two maximum-length LFSRs R 1 and R 2 , with lengths L 1 and L 2 , respectively. The PN-sequence {a i } produced by R 1 decimates the PN-sequence {b i } generated by the other register R 2 . Given two bits a i and b i , i = 0, 1, 2, . . . from both PN-sequences, the output sequence {s j } of the generator is obtained as follows: if a i = 1 then s j = b i and if a i = 0 then b i is discarded.
The sequence {s j } is called the shrunken sequence. It has period T = (2 L2 − 1)2
and its number of 1s is 2 L1+L2−2 . Besides, the characteristic polynomial has the form p(x) m , with 2 L1−2 < m ≤ 2 L1−1 and p(x) a primitive polynomial of degree L 2 [4] . This generator has good cryptographic properties, is easy to implement and was first introduced in [2] . The characteristic polynomial of the registers R 1 and R 2 are known and the key of this generator is the initial state of each register.
Cellular automata (CA) were introduced by von Neumann as simple models to study biological processes such as self-reproduction 
Modelling the shrunken sequence
In this section, we highlight some properties of the shrunken sequence, which will be used in the recovering algorithm proposed in Section 4. From now on, we consider two registers R 1 and R 2 , with characteristic polynomials
L1 − 1 and T 2 = 2 L2 − 1 the periods of their corresponding PN-sequences, respectively. Besides, the PN-sequences generated by both registers are {a i } and {b i }, respectively. We assume without loss of generality that a 0 = 1. The shrunken sequence {s j } generated by both registers will have period
Properties of the shrunken sequence
If we decimate the shrunken sequence {s j } by 2 L1−1 , we get 2 L1−1 PN-sequences whose characteristic polynomial is p(x). These sequences are called the interleaved PN-sequences of the shrunken sequence. All these PN-sequences have the same characteristic polynomial and, thus, there is one single PN-sequence but shifted. This shift depends on the positions of the 1s in the PN-sequence {a i }.
If the first interleaved sequence is decimated by δ, then the resultant sequence is {b i }.
As a consequence, if we decimate the shrunken sequence by 2 L1−1 δ, we obtain the PNsequence {b i } again.
Corollary 1. If the primitive polynomials
On the other hand, we analyse now how to recover {a i } from {s j }. Assume the first interleaved PN-sequence is {v i }. Since the other interleaved PN-sequences are the same but shifted, we assume they have the form 
Sequences in the CA
is the Zech logarithm of 1 (see [6] ). Consider a linear CA that uses rule 102 and the sequence in the zero column is the PNsequence {u i }. It is not difficult to check that the sequences in columns whose indices are 2 j , for j = 0, 1, 2, . . ., have the form {u i + u i+2 j }. Using the previous reasoning, we can see that every column is the same PN-sequence
positions, respectively. Besides, since the CA is cyclic, the length of the CA must be T /gcd (T, d).
Consider the shrunken sequence {s j }, whose characteristic polynomial is
of p(x). This means that the CA generate 2
L1−1 sequences, including the shrunken sequence, before generating the shrunken sequence again shifted D positions. According to this, the CA must have length L = T 2 L1−1 /gcd (D, T ).
The other sequences in the CA
If we locate the shrunken sequence in the zero column of the CA, 2 L1−1 different sequences are generated, including the shrunken sequence. All these sequence have the same characteristic polynomial p(x) m and are composed of 2
L1−1 PN-sequences with characteristic polynomial p(x).
Consequently, we can deduce that the fact of knowing some bits of the other sequences of the CA can help us to recover parts of the shrunken sequence. More precisely, we can recover the first interleaved PN-sequence of the shrunken sequence using the other interleaved PN-sequences of the same shrunken sequence and the interleaved PN-sequences of the other sequences generated by the CA.
Assume the interleaved PN-sequences of the shrunken sequence are denoted by {v d0+i },
Remember that the shifts d k depend on the location of the 1s in the PN-sequence {a i } generated by the first register R 1 . If the interleaved PN-sequences of the next sequence in the CA are denoted by
+i }, these new positions can be computed as follows
Similarly, we can compute the shifts d 
Cryptanalysis
In this section we introduce a cryptanalysis of the shrinking generator based on the results given in Section 3. This attack is based on an exhaustive search over the initial states of the first register R 1 . Thus, the complexity of the brute-force attack is reduced by a factor 2 L2 . Given two primitive polynomials p 1 (x) and p 2 (x) that generate the shrunken sequence, the characteristic polynomial p(x) m can be computed using these two polynomials. Given n bits, s s s = {s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 }, of the shrunken sequence, the function given in Algorithm 1 tests every initial state a a a of length L 1 for R 1 . As output, the function provides a set of possible correct initial states.
It is worth pointing out that this work can be equivalently done with rule 60,
. In this case, the sequences would appear in inverse order, but the results would be identical.
Conclusions
The shrinking generator was conceived and designed as a nonlinear keystream generator based on maximum-length LFSRs. However, this generator can be modelled in terms of CA using rule 102. The effort to introduce decimation in order to break the inherent linearity of the LFSRs has been useless, since the shrunken sequence can be modelled as the output sequence of a model based on linear CA. In this work, we analyse a family of one-dimensional, linear, regular and cyclic 102 CA that describe the behaviour of the shrinking generator. These CA generate a family of sequences with the same characteristic polynomial and period as the shrunken sequence. Taking advantage of the linearity and the similarity between the sequences generated by the CA, we propose a cryptanalysis based on the exhaustive search among the initial states of the first register. 
